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Working Effectively in Post-Confl ict 
and Humanitarian Situations: Tools for 
Communication, Collaboration, and 
Negotiation was held October 15-19, 
2006, at the Naval Postgraduate School 
in Monterey, California. Representatives 
from nongovernmental organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations, 
government civilian agencies, and the US 
armed forces gathered to discuss negotiation 
principles, practice new skills, and learn best 
practices from experts. The event was hosted 
by CSRS and was cosponsored by the United 
States Institute of Peace, drawing from their 
successful curriculum on negotiation issues. 
About This Event
The United States Institute of Peace
The United States Institute 
of Peace is an independent, 
non-partisan, national 
institution established and 
funded by Congress. Its goals are to help 
prevent and resolve violent international 
confl icts, promote post-confl ict stability and 
democratic transformations, and increase 
peacebuilding capacity, tools, and intellectual 
capital worldwide. The Institute does this by 
empowering others with knowledge, skills, and 
resources, as well as by its direct involvement 
in peacebuilding efforts around the globe. For 
more information, please visit www.usip.org. 
The Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) 
is a teaching institute which 
develops and hosts educational 
programs for stabilization and reconstruction 
practitioners operating around the globe. 
Established by the Naval Postgraduate School 
in 2004 through the vision and congressional 
support of Congressman Sam Farr, CSRS 
creates a wide array of programs to foster 
dialogue among practitioners, as well as help 
them develop new strategies and refi ne best 
practices to improve the effectiveness of their 
important global work.
 
Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, CSRS also contributes to 
the university’s research and graduate degree 
programs. For more information about CSRS, 
its philosophy, and programs, please visit 
www.nps.edu/csrs. 
The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
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Executive Summary
As post-confl ict and humanitarian needs grow 
globally, the military is playing a larger role 
in relief and reconstruction work. This new 
dynamic, coupled with the fl uid nature of 
crises, is causing relief actors to rethink how 
they function and interact in the fi eld. While 
the military and humanitarian communities 
necessarily have different missions, 
cooperation and information sharing can 
improve the effectiveness and security of 
all actors. The Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies has hosted a number 
of events on these critical topics, analyzing 
the roles these communities play in crises and 
helping participants create new strategies for 
working together or sharing the same space. 
As relief practitioners seek to bridge cultural 
divides and resolve issues in the fi eld, 
negotiation expertise can be critical. Skilled 
negotiators can illuminate parties’ needs, 
delineate common ground, and help groups 
achieve successful outcomes. Sometimes 
individuals negotiate with other relief actors, 
seeking to clarify roles and responsibilities. 
Other times they negotiate with a wide array 
of players, including host governments, 
activists, and rebel factions, seeking to 
avert or minimize crises and prevent states 
from failing. Often such negotiations 
or mediations are informal and ad hoc, 
resulting from the various actors’ efforts 
to conduct relief or other activities in local 
communities. Changing political dynamics, 
security concerns, health issues, and refugee 
concerns can add complexity and urgency to 
multiparty negotiations, requiring that third 
parties use skill, sensitivity, and fl exibility to 
resolve escalating disputes.
To help relief practitioners improve 
their negotiation expertise, the Center for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies 
(CSRS) teamed with the United States 
Institute for Peace (USIP) Professional 
Training Program to provide hands-on 
skills training. Working Effectively in Post-
Confl ict and Humanitarian Situations: Tools 
for Communication, Collaboration, and 
Negotiation, held October 15-19, 2006, at 
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California, brought together junior and mid-
level representatives from nongovernmental 
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organizations (IGOs), government civilian 
agencies, and the US armed forces to discuss 
the civilian-military relationship and hone 
negotiation skills using self-assessment 
and role play in a series of increasingly 
complex scenarios.  This program leveraged 
USIP’s proven curriculum for preparing 
practitioners for the complex negotiation 
situations that can arise during large-scale 
overseas emergencies.
Working Effectively opened with remarks 
from two industry luminaries: Ambassador 
John E. Herbst and Congressman Sam 
Farr. A career member of the Senior 
Foreign Service, Ambassador Herbst held 
diplomatic posts in Israel, Russia, and 
Saudi Arabia, before serving as an 
ambassador to both Uzbekistan and 
the Ukraine. Now serving as the US 
State Department’s Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), 
Ambassador Herbst discussed the challenges 
of coordinating interagency efforts for 
stabilization and reconstruction. As a new 
“startup” in the US Government, S/CRS is 
forging new relationships and seeking to 
overcome bureaucratic resistance to 
change. Additionally, S/CRS is pioneering 
a civilian response corps to provide 
targeted expertise for stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts around the world. 
Although this effort has been small-scale 
thus far, Ambassador Herbst hopes to build 
a corps that is some 200 professionals 
strong in the next few years. Members of 
the corps would be able to staff a wide array 
of critical positions, ranging from advisors 
to government ministries, to engineers, to 
health workers, all with the capability to 
deploy on 48 hours of notice. 
Participants were very interested in the concept 
of a new civilian response corps and asked 
a number of questions about how it would 
interact with the military, what positions it 
would staff, its prospects for funding, and 
countries of engagement. Ambassador Herbst 
acknowledged that deployments are not 
yet systematic and expressed hopes that 
adequate program funding and broader 
acceptance of the concept would increase the 
use of this important, innovative instrument of 
the US Government. 
Image above: Participants attend the opening ceremony with speeches by 
Ambassador John E. Herbst and Congressman Sam Farr. 
Image at right: Colonel Christopher Holshek presents his views on the 
US Army Civil Affairs’ mission. 
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After the question and answer session, 
Congressman Sam Farr (CA-17) welcomed 
participants to the event, saying that 
they were at the “cutting-edge of world 
diplomacy.” As a member of the House 
Appropriations Committee and a participant 
on a blue-ribbon panel on the problem 
of failed states, Congressman Farr was 
instrumental in creating CSRS. Said 
Congressman Farr:
We have the talent as a country to 
fi x things that are broken in the 
world. But we have problems, 
either cross-culturally or across 
organizations. We don’t talk to 
each other. And on the ground 
it all plays out.
Congressman Farr said that courses such 
as this one were critical to creating the next 
generation of leaders. “We are building 
something here that is new,” said Farr, 
exhorting participants to use newly acquired 
skills to serve as change agents in their 
organizations and in the fi eld.
We at CSRS are extremely grateful to 
Congressman Sam Farr for his leadership 
in founding our organization and for his 
continuing support of our work. Through our 
short courses, we help practitioners develop 
the critical insights, skills, and relationships 
they need to increase their effectiveness in 
the fi eld. From the Congo to Sri Lanka to 
Afghanistan to the Sudan, these practitioners 
are working on the front lines of crisis, 
helping to mitigate human suffering, end 
confl ict, and rebuild infrastructures and 
societies. To echo Ambassador Herbst, the 
problem of failed states is one of the foremost 
challenges of our time; rebuilding these 
states and helping to heal their societies is an 
imperative we gladly share with all of you. 
“The problem of failed states — the need to stabilize and 
reconstruct them – is one of the primary challenges of our time.” 
-  Ambassador John E. Herbst
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Exploring Cultural Differences 
in Conﬂ ict Situations 
How do organizations differ in their 
approach to stabilization and reconstruction 
work? And what are some of the challenges 
that individuals face in the fi eld? Three 
practitioners, with experience in the 
US Government, US military, and a 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) led a 
panel discussion to give participants a primer 
on organizational culture, as well as share 
their personal experiences and perspectives. 
Viewpoint: The US Government
Opening the discussion, David Lyon, a former 
US ambassador to Fiji, talked about the 
tension between relief actors, all of whom are 
focused on their unique missions. While each 
group wants its mission to succeed, different 
backgrounds, processes, personalities, even 
vocabularies, hinder cooperation between the 
groups. With government civilians deploying 
simultaneously with combat troops, these 
tensions have been greatly magnifi ed. 
Lyon outlined the State Department’s 
structure and employee mix. While the US 
State Department has a good record for 
responding to natural disasters, it has a more 
checkered record with political crises. One 
key reason: The US State Department’s six 
regional bureaus wield tremendous power 
and can limit the infl uence of the functional 
bureaus that might have specifi c expertise 
relevant to the problem at hand. However, 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has 
sought to ease this problem in part by 
creating the Offi ce of the Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization now 
headed by Ambassador Herbst. 
Lyon discussed other key players in 
development, including the United States 
Agency for International Development 
(USAID), which has undergone a controversial 
realignment to focus on security, and 
embassies worldwide. Lyon outlined the 
different roles and responsibilities of embassy 
staff and explained how their professional 
status can affect their behaviors and 
priorities. Ambassadors must navigate these 
alliances and motivate staff to be successful. 
Lyon offered tips for NGOs working in 
the fi eld. Call on your local ambassador, he 
















“With civilians moving in simultaneously with combat troops, we are now in 
entirely a new dimension for stabilization and reconstruction work. It brings 
tension to our cultural differences.”  - Former Ambassador David Lyon (Ret.)
with the deputy chief of mission. Meet with 
the local USAID director to learn about the 
contract bid cycle and priorities. And lastly, 
attend diplomatic functions. These events 
are target-rich environments where you will 
meet ambassadors and other senior leaders 
working in your fi eld.
Viewpoint: The US Army Civil Affairs
Following David Lyon’s presentation, 
Colonel Christopher Holshek spoke on the 
changing mandate of the US Army, which 
is increasingly involved in stabilization 
and reconstruction activities around the 
world. According to Holshek, 90% of all 
nontraditional threats to security now arise 
from the civil sector, not the armed forces. 
The global rise of religious confl ict, terrorism, 
drug traffi cking, and other ills are creating 
signifi cant threats to national security. 
However, America can no longer afford to 
settle confl icts with superior materiel and 
logistics. Recovering from the impact of 
9/11 alone cost the country a trillion dollars, 
and terrorism continues to be a signifi cant 
drain on resources. As our leaders and the 
armed forces grapple with resource issues, 
we are beginning to rely on “soft power” or 
international leverage. Our national security 
strategy recognizes the need for civil power, 
but that is not yet refl ected in our annual 
budget, said Holshek. 
The military’s historic model for operations, 
unifi ed action, doesn’t necessarily apply to 
today’s global crises. With multiple players 
operating in the fi eld, reconstruction can 
occur simultaneously with military 
operations. The military can enable nation-
building by improving security conditions 
so that civil groups work more effectively. 
Ideally, the entire community will move to a 
model where we can identify and work with 
states at crisis onset: It is signifi cantly cheaper 
to help prevent states from collapsing than 
to rebuild them after they have failed. 
Holshek outlined the work of the Civil 
Affairs Command, noting these specialists 
comprise less than 0.5% of the US Army 
and are primarily reservists. Civil Affairs is 
short-staffed and needs to be professionalized, 
said Holshek; however, fi xes are not slated 
until 2012. We need to evolve civil-military 
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 “It is cheaper to help keep a state from failing than to stabilize 
it and reconstruct it after it has failed. We  need to help create 
the conditions that will keep that region stable.” 
 - Colonel Christopher Holshek
operations into a joint function, building 
relationships with civilian counterparts, 
training together, and developing skills as 
professional nation-builders, said Holshek.
Viewpoint: A Nongovernmental 
Organization 
Presenting a contrasting perspective, 
Kaitlin Shilling, a former project 
director for DAI, outlined the types of 
organizations typically working in the fi eld: 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 
and contractors. While contractors are 
profi t-focused, NGOs and IGOs are likely 
to be true humanitarian actors, seeking 
to ameliorate human suffering. As a 
consequence, they are usually much more 
integrated into the local community than 
are government and military representatives. 
How NGOs interact with other groups 
depends upon a number of factors, 
including the organization’s nationality, 
its bureaucratic structure, leadership, the 
project, and the local context. Personalities 
play a major role and often strongly 
infl uence outcomes. 
NGOs are struggling with the military’s 
evolving role in post-confl ict and relief 
operations. As neutral, impartial organizations, 
many NGOs take care not to overstep their 
organizational boundaries and collude with 
the military. However, some donors are now 
mandating cooperation, and so NGOs must 
fi nd a way to dialogue with the military while 
honoring their mandate of neutrality.  
Ms. Shilling mentioned that her presentation 
was signifi cantly abbreviated because 
the fi rst two presenters ran overschedule.  
This discourtesy, she warned, is the type 
of act that reinforces the cultural divide 
between organizations. Her remark struck 
a chord with participants. On a subsequent 
day, a military offi cer referenced the 
incident and said that we need to provide 
all organizations with the platform and 
opportunity to speak.
During the question and answer session 
following Ms. Shilling’s presentation, 
panelists discussed the challenges inherent 
in fi eld operations. Ms. Shilling said that 
political promises create expectations that 
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Workshop participant 
Kate Ahern, a Program 
Ofﬁ cer with the Citizens 
Development Corps, 
talks to Ambassador 
John E. Herbst, S/CRS 
Coordinator (left), and 
Nick Tomb, CSRS Program 
Coordinator (right). 
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often aren’t realized on the ground. And 
Colonel Holshek advised against genericizing 
NGOs, stating that there are vast differences 
in organization size, scope, and focus. 
Demonstrating the truth of his remark, 
workshop participants represented a 
wide range of NGOs, from the Toledo 
International Peace Center, which provides 
confl ict resolution training and mediation 
services in Iraq and Latin America; to the 
Campaign for the Innocent Victims of 
Violence, which lobbies Congress on behalf 
of Afghan and Iraqi war victims; to Partners 
for Democratic Change, which focuses on 
institution-building; to the Kosovan Nansen 
Dialogue which brings Albanian and Serb 
factions together to discuss issues and 
work towards integrating the community. 
A complete list of event participants is 
provided at report close.
While Colonel Holshek cited the growing 
interdependence of all communities, an 
NGO representative was quick to draw 
demarcations between the players: 
“When the US military is deployed, 
it goes into an area to achieve certain 
political objectives. That is not why 
humanitarian people go into an area. 
You can say we’re on the same team, 
but we’re not,” she said. 
“When the US military is deployed, it goes into an area to achieve 
certain political objectives. That is not why humanitarian people go 
into an area. You can say we’re on the same team, but we’re not.”
-  NGO Representative
Understanding and Optimizing 
Conﬂ ict and Negotiation Skills 
How do people negotiate? And what informs 
their decisions? To understand their personal 
negotiation styles, workshop facilitator Nina 
Sughrue had participants complete the Thomas-
Killman Confl ict Mode Instrument,1 the world’s 
best-selling tool for confl ict resolution. While 
participants typically possessed attributes of 
all fi ve confl ict styles – competitor, avoider, 
compromiser, accommodator, and collaborator 
– they had a dominant style that unconsciously 
infl uenced their negotiation choices. Ms. 
Sughrue asked participants to break into groups 
and discuss the major attributes of their primary 
approach to confl ict.  
Strengths and Weaknesses 
of Different Conﬂ ict Styles
As groups presented their confl ict styles, Ms. 
Sughrue pointed out the positive and negative 
aspects of each approach. Competing can be 
effective when your interests are at stake or 
you are under attack, but it can also antagonize 
your counterpart, she said. As a consequence, 
this approach is most suited to one-time 
negotiations and can be detrimental to 
building long-term relationships. While being 
competitive is most effective when you possess 
power, sometimes having moral authority 
allows you to prevail in situations where you 
are essentially powerless. The work of Gandhi 
and Martin Luther King provides two powerful 
cases in point. 
Avoidance, the opposite of competition, can be 
an effective strategy to buy time for decision 
making, but it can also escalate confl ict and 
extend it. People who live in confl ict situations 
are typically avoiders, said Ms. Sughrue, as they 
seek to limit their exposure to further suffering. 
Compromising works well when parties are 
equally committed and powerful and have 
a limited amount of time for negotiation; 
however, it may require making concessions 
that sacrifi ce key interests or short-circuit 
the ability to create a more effective solution 
through collaboration. 
Accommodators give away key interests 
to build trust, but can lose more than they 
bargained for if relationships aren’t reciprocal 
or counterparts view them as weak. And 
fi nally, collaboration gives parties time to 









Program Ofﬁ cer 
United States 
Institute of Peace
How do people negotiate? And what informs their decisions? According to 
workshop facilitator Nina Sughrue, individuals have a dominant confl ict style 
that infl uences their negotiation choices. That style has both strengths and 
weaknesses, so it’s important to understand the ramifi cations of implementing 
that confl ict style and know when it’s appropriate to adopt another approach. 
1  Thomas, K. W. 
and R. H. Killman, 
Thomas-Killman 




the primary attributes, 
both positive and negative, 
of their approach to 
conﬂ ict.  After each group 
presented their conﬂ ict 
style attributes to the group, 
workshop facilitator Nina 
Sughrue led a discussion 
on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the ﬁ ve 
different approaches. 
but can be inappropriate when time is limited 
or issues are not signifi cant. 
In negotiations, you will often face parties 
with different confl ict styles and run the risk 
of creating unproductive results. If a competer 
and an avoider are paired, the negotiation 
will end quickly or stalemate. Meanwhile, 
two collaborators may spend excessive time 
creating an unworkable solution or even 
generate multiple outcomes. 
Answering participant questions, Ms. 
Sughrue acknowledged that interest-based 
negotiation was a Western model, but that 
simply avoiding issues typically worsened 
them. Thus, its principles could be applied to 
global issues. Since crises are often very fl uid, 
good negotiators should come to the table 
fully prepared, be aware of both parties’ 
interests, and stay fl exible enough to adapt 
to changing dynamics. 
The Odin Negotiation: 
Practicing New Principles
To put new insights into practice, the group 
split into two-person teams, assuming the 
roles of a local activist and an oil executive 
in the fi ctional city of Odin. With its rich 
oil reserves, Odin has seen an infl ux of oil 
companies; however, it will be another decade 
before local citizens see major fi nancial 
benefi ts from their precious natural resources. 
As a consequence, the Old Town of Odin 
and its beautiful historic buildings have been 
neglected, and foreign investors are now 
buying and renovating buildings for their 
own use. MegaOil has recently purchased 
a 500-year-old building, the Palace, and 
wants to expand it by adding seven new 
stories to the original three-story structure. 
The new addition will create offi ce space 
and apartments for MegaOil employees and 
wealthy local renters, but clearly violates new 
regulations that the Old Town Association 
(OTA) lobbied for and the government 
recently passed. 
Each member of the two-person group 
was given a fact sheet outlining his or her 
position, its strengths and weaknesses, and 
baseline terms for a successful negotiation. 
One member of each group assumed the 
role of the OTA Chairman, while the other 
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acted as the MegaOil Odin Operations 
Director. The OTA Chairman’s objectives 
were to obtain guarantees that MegaOil 
would preserve the architectural integrity 
of the building, minimize the number of 
new stories built, and provide reduced-rate 
housing for local citizens. Meanwhile, the 
MegaOil executive’s goals were to build the 
tallest structure possible to maximize the 
profi tability of the project.  
Understanding Positions, 
Creating Win-Win Outcomes
Participants spent a little over an hour 
conducting the exercise. After returning to 
the larger group, participants discussed their 
strategies. One MegaOil representative used 
a “carrot and stick” approach – fi rst 
threatening to leave the country, then 
extending an offer to the OTA to collaborate 
with architects on designing the new plan. In 
another group, the OTA Chairman conceded 
a taller structure in exchange for a greater 
number of reduced-rate apartments. Most 
were able to articulate their positions – profi t 
for MegaOil and historical preservation for 
OTA – and then work to create an effective 
compromise. As Ms. Sughrue pointed out, 
the parties’ objectives were not incompatible 
and multiple outcomes were possible. 
Moving Past Positions to Interests 
While people’s positions are often easily 
uncovered during a negotiation, their 
interests may be more diffi cult to deduce. 
Sometimes individuals are not even 
aware of what their own interests are 
if there is a strong emotional context 
to the issue at hand. Says Ms. Sughrue: 
“Positions are what negotiators say they 
want; interests are what they need.” 
Consequently, understanding parties’ 
interests is absolutely critical to executing 
a successful negotiation. Negotiators who 
focus on positions alone risk creating 
deadlock, while those who can uncover 
their counterparts’ interests may avoid or 
circumvent roadblocks by demonstrating 
shared or compatible goals.
Understanding Your BATNA
Before beginning a negotiation, each party 
needs to understand its BATNA2 – the best 
alternative to a non-negotiated agreement. 
10 Understanding and Optimizing Conﬂ ict and Negotiation Skills
Captain Brian M. Swiegart of 
the US Army and Dr. Laina 
Reynolds Levy, a Program 
Manager with Partners 
for Democratic Change, 
negotiate the Odin exercise 
and seek to create win-win 
results for their ﬁ ctional 
organizations. 
2  Fisher, Roger, William L. Ury 
and Bruce Patton. “Original 
Explanation of BATNA.” In 
Getting to Yes: Negotiating 
Agreement Without Giving 
In, Second Edition, 101-111. 
Boston: Houghton Miffl in 
Co., April 1992. 
What will each side do if no agreement 
is reached? What are the implications of 
walking away? It’s critical to have a backup 
strategy, says Ms. Sughrue. Understanding 
your BATNA gives you fl exibility and power, 
while keeping you on target through the 
course of the negotiation. 
Best Practices for 
Negotiating Successfully
What are some best practices for 
negotiation? Determine your own interests 
fi rst, but don’t assume you understand the 
other party’s needs. Let the other person 
talk fi rst if you need to gain clarity. And 
avoid narrowing the negotiation to one 
issue. The more issues you have on the table, 
the greater opportunity you will have to 
build trust and rapport. If you are facing 
off against a bully, avoid the temptation 
to meet force with force. Try to present 
your ideas in an attractive way and use 
your understanding of the other party’s 
perspective to shape your negotiation 
strategy. Otherwise, you risk devolving the 
negotiation into a fruitless debate, where 
parties jockey to show their strength. 
Participants discussed whether you should 
always ask for more than you expect 
to get and are willing to settle for. One 
participant said that it’s important to have 
some throwaways as concession points, 
while another said that it’s often possible to 
get what you need just by letting the other 
party talk. Still another said the issue at 
hand should govern the approach: If you are 
bargaining over price, it’s important to aim 
high, but in policy talks, it might be counter-
productive. The other party might leave, 
putting you in a position of weakness if talks 
restarted. Participants concluded that no 
simple formula exists that can be applied to 
each situation successfully.
Cultural Differences with Negotiation
Participants discussed how negotiation 
styles can vary greatly across countries 
and organizations. A routine marketplace 
exchange in India might include demands that 
would seem preposterous in another culture, 
but would be encouraged and accepted 
there. A participant who had worked in 
France countered with an example of how 
her organization had overscoped its budget, 
“Understanding your BATNA – your best alternative to a 
non-negotiated agreement – gives you ﬂ exibility and power. 
It will help you achieve your goals.”  
- Workshop Facilitator Nina Sughrue
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a common practice in the United States, but 
one that had created credibility problems 
with the donor organization, which then 
demanded much stricter accounting. Ms. 
Sughrue also stated that the various actors in 
the relief community – the State Department, 
military, and NGOs – have different cultures 
which may affect their negotiation styles and 
impact the overall process. A military offi cer 
disagreed with her assertion. “Most military 
offi cers get their graduate degrees from 
civilian institutions. I learned about BATNA 
at graduate school. Beyond the military focus, 
I don’t think there’s any difference at all.”
Misperceptions about 
Military Authority
This comment launched a lively discussion 
on common misperceptions about military 
authority. Said one offi cer: “We delegate 
responsibility to the lowest level, but not 
authority.” As a consequence, one of the 
military participants advised being upfront 
with negotiation counterparts about 
decision-making limits. However, another 
thought that position too negative and 
recommended leading with capabilities, 
rather than limitations. Said yet another 
exasperated offi cer: “I’ve heard three times 
that unless I’m a military commander, I have 
to do what I’m told. That’s not true. I have 
a mission, and as long as it’s not illegal, 
immoral, or fattening, I can get there any 
way I want.”
The Impact of Gender 
Participants then discussed how gender 
affects a negotiator’s position and leverage. 
As a young State Department offi cial, Ms. 
Sughrue said that she found her age to be 
more of a hindrance than her gender, but has 
had to work with women of other cultures, 
including Pakistan, to teach them to be less 
accommodating and more competitive. An 
IGO member who works in Pakistan said 
that most of the lead positions for earthquake 
relief are held by women, and that they 
are actually far more effective than men 
because community leaders listen to them 
with respect.
The Third Party’s Role
In the fi eld, negotiations often aren’t linear 
progressions and can break down or reach 
“I’ve heard three times that unless I’m a military commander, I have 
to do what I’m told. That’s not true. I have a mission, and as long as 
it’s not illegal, immoral, or fattening, I can get there any way I want.” 
-  Military Ofﬁ cer
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a point where further discussion is futile or 
undesirable. In these instances, it may be  
helpful to invite a third party to the table. 
The third party can play an array of roles: 
from relaying messages to opposing sides, to 
offering mediation services, to ending disputes 
forcibly, said United States Institute of Peace 
presenter Jonathan Morgenstein. (See graphic 
above.) If two parties aren’t speaking, a third 
entity can provide conciliation, interpreting 
each side’s demands and messages to the 
other, as Henry Kissinger did with the Arabs 
and Israelis. When adversarial parties are 
willing to engage in talks, third parties can 
act as facilitators, making sure that the 
conversation stays on course, or assume 
roles as mediators, helping parties 
understand their positions and interests 
and move towards an agreement.
Further along the spectrum, a power mediator 
will use a combination of incentives and 
punitive measures to achieve desired results, 
while an arbiter will resolve issues for 
warring parties unilaterally. Power mediators 
include Jimmy Carter, who offered fi nancial 
incentives to help Israel and Egypt fi nalize 
the Camp David accords, and Richard 
Holbrooke who brought Bosnian, Croatian, 
and Bosnian Serb leaders to the unlikely 
locale of Dayton, Ohio, to end the Bosnian 
war. While third parties intervene in different 
ways, they help warring parties focus on key 
issues, work towards crafting a resolution, 
and begin building new relationships. 
Eventually, the third party will hand off 
supervision to another entity to ensure that 
peace agreements are followed. Sometimes 
there are multiple third parties involved; in 
these instances, a lead organization or nation 
can help maintain unity among all groups and 
bring order to a chaotic peace process. 
Handling Complex Negotiations
If negotiations between two parties are 
complex, what happens when the number of 
players increases? That question undergirded 
the group’s next simulation, a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) exercise, led by 
Nicholas Tomb, CSRS Program Coordinator. 
For this exercise, participants represented 
key players at a North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) meeting called to 
discuss the relationship between PRTs and 
Third parties can play a 
wide array of roles in 
negotiations, from merely 
facilitating meetings to 
forcibly negotiating peace 
between warring parties.
Understanding and Optimizing Conﬂ ict and Negotiation Skills 13
humanitarian organizations in Afghanistan. 
Participants were asked to explore the 
potential for coordination and information 
sharing among the groups, as well as discuss 
the security challenges faced by their 
particular organization. 
Ms. Sughrue encouraged participants to 
prepare for the session by evaluating the key 
players in the negotiation, their interests,  
and any resources that could be brought to 
bear. Even small issues – the venue, seating, 
schedule, and ground rules – should be 
determined in advance to avoid creating 
unnecessary misunderstandings. All parties 
should be allowed to share their perspectives, 
and the mediator should work towards 
creating a solution that solves key problems, 
addresses interests, and focuses on a 
long-term outcome.  
A PRT Meeting: Creating 
Constructive Communication
Participants were assigned roles representing 
key players who would likely be attending 
such a meeting: the US Army Civil Affairs, 
NATO, the United Nations Offi ce 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA), NGOs, and the 
Afghan Ministry of the Interior. On the 
recommendation of an IGO staffer, workshop 
facilitators changed the composition of the 
NGOs, so that instead of being US-based, 
one was British and the other French. The 
NATO representative was instructed to chair 
the meeting and push other participants 
towards consensus, as well as create specifi c 
information-sharing processes. 
After working through the simulation, the 
breakout groups reported on their progress. 
The fi rst group decided to share information 
through UNOCHA to avoid compromising 
NGO independence, hold high-level meetings 
nationally and out-of-country, and meet 
monthly at the regional level. While one 
of the NGOs asked the military to stop 
distributing relief goods to avoid encroaching 
on NGO work, this request was denied.
Using UNOCHA as an 
Information Conduit
Similarly, the second group agreed to use 
UNOCHA as an intermediary. Participants 
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agreed to hold monthly in-person meetings, 
with one NGO opting to join the meetings 
via telephone to avoid the perception of 
colluding with the military. NATO and the 
US Army would distribute daily updates of 
unclassifi ed information to group members 
via an online portal. NGOs would provide 
input into military planning, but setting 
strategy would remain the province of the 
military. One of the NGOs created a memo 
of understanding with the US Army to 
delineate responsibilities and operational 
autonomy, while a side meeting between 
another NGO and the Afghan minister 
went sour, resulting in threats and 
accusations. The NGO representative 
didn’t want to report to the minister and 
threatened to take his case to the media, 
while the Afghan minister called his bluff 
and asked him to leave the country. 
Creating Multi-Faceted Approaches 
to Information Sharing 
The third group split information sharing 
into two categories: relief and security. Relief 
issues were non-controversial, and NATO 
and NGOs agreed to share information on 
operations through the Afghan minister. 
The minister would host two meetings, one 
with the NGO community and one with 
the PRT representatives. The reason why? 
“He will eventually become the main 
conduit for information anyway,” said 
a group member. 
Security issues proved more diffi cult. The 
group agreed that NATO would provide 
information on structural and security threats 
as long as it didn’t compromise military 
missions. Meanwhile, NGOs would share 
security threat and crime data, but not 
information on demonstrations or protestors, 
with PRTs.  
The Media as Validator
The fourth group also decided to use the 
Afghan minister as a conduit, but chose to 
make their choice extremely public, inviting 
the media to an inaugural meeting to help 
validate the proceedings. Meetings would 
be held weekly and attended by the minister, 
with UNOCHA facilitating discussion until 
the minister gained legitimacy in the eyes 
of attendees. 
Robert Ord, Dean of 
the Naval Postgraduate 
School of International 
Graduate Studies talks with 
Congressman Sam Farr 
at the reception after the 
opening ceremony. 
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NGO representatives said they weren’t as 
cooperative as they should have been because 
the minister was pushing for information
instead of NATO. “When we were asked to be 
more cooperative, we reverted to our 
stereotypes. We yanked back that little bit 
of hope that the minister, NATO, and 
Civil Affairs had,” said one.  
“Standing in Someone Else’s Shoes”
Participants discussed how diffi cult it 
was to play parts that were diametrically 
opposed to their real-world roles. “To be 
so out-of-character was really diffi cult,” 
said an NGO representative. “In the real 
world, I’d know what to say when something 
got refuted.” Another group member 
requested that the next simulation pair 
individuals with more compatible roles: “I 
would like to hear people’s strong arguments 
when they’re in their normal roles. I would 
like to hear the NGO viewpoint.” However, 
several participants said it was useful to 
“stand in someone else’s shoes.” Joked a 
military offi cer: “I watched the other Captains 
reading the instructions and feeling dirty 
about the role they had to play as NGO 
workers. I know they’re going to have to 
watch Band of Brothers start to fi nish to 
get over it.”
PRTs: A Work in Progress
The group also discussed the actual track 
record of PRTs. While several participants 
thought PRTs were a good idea, they 
said their success was wildly variable and 
dependent upon the group’s priorities, 
resources, and local leadership. Other 
impediments to success included a lack 
of consistency across teams, diffi culties 
meeting local expectations, and changing 
scope. While PRTs can solve local problems, 
fi nding money and tools to develop the 
local infrastructure and economy, they can 
only tackle problems that are in line with 
government priorities. Another challenge 
is that the purpose of PRTs – long-term 
development – is at odds with their staffi ng. 
Said one participant: “You can’t have 
something with a long-term mission that 
changes personnel every six months and 
scope with each new commander.”
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Joked one military ofﬁ cer about his peers who were assigned 
to play NGO representatives during the negotiation exercise: 
“I know they’re going to have to watch Band of Brothers start 
to ﬁ nish to get over it.”
Creating a Political Language 
for Peace 
How do you create a language for peace? 
And what does reconciliation look like in 
a society scarred by years of violence and 
deep cultural divides? These important 
questions have guided Reverend Byron Bland 
in his work as a practitioner who has sought 
to make the connection between theory 
and practice through his organization, 
the Stanford Center on Confl ict and 
Negotiation; as the author of Getting 
Beyond Cheap Talk; and in his hands-on 
work in Northern Ireland.
What Reconciliation Means
In her seminal work The Human Condition, 
Hannah Arendt defi nes reconciliation as 
forgiveness for the past and a promise for 
the future. While most researchers have 
focused on forgiveness, Bland feels that 
the hope of a shared future is what allows 
warring parties to end strife and work 
towards reconciliation. This hope can be 
complicated by competing objectives: 
A party who feels he is sustaining signifi cant 
losses needs to see cooperation from the other 
side to feel that reconciliation is politically 
and socially meaningful. 
In Northern Ireland, local citizens didn’t 
have much say in the political process, which 
was being steered by the British and Irish 
Governments. Community Dialogue sought 
to engage local citizens by asking three core 
questions: What do you want? Why do you 
want it? And given that others disagree, what 
can you live with? 
Barriers to Cross-Cultural 
Understanding
According to Bland, there are three primary 
barriers to creating understanding between 
competing factions: naive realism, false 
polarization, and reactive devaluation. A naive 
realist believes that his view of the world 
captures the way it really is; anyone who 
doesn’t share his views or refuses to change 
has evil motives. If an opposing party does 
something good, it manifests his strategic or 
tactical understanding of the situation; on the 
other hand, the naive realist’s action refl ects 
the inherent goodness of his character.
False polarization occurs when parties 
can’t see the ambivalence of the other 
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To bring a real-life perspective to the group’s training, workshop facilitators invited 
a guest speaker, Reverend Byron Bland, to discuss his work in Northern Ireland. 
Bland has helped a grassroots organization, Community Dialogue, explore the 
social and political dynamics of reconciliation. 
ground that they share. To counteract false 
polarization, each party should articulate 
the strongest arguments for his opponent’s 
position to demonstrate that he understands 
the other side’s needs and desires.
Reactive devaluation occurs when one party 
diminishes the value of another’s offer. The 
recipient becomes suspicious, analyzing the 
offer to see if there is a trick involved and 
minimizes its worth. This makes the giver 
unhappy, because the concession involves 
real political cost. To prevent reactive 
devaluation, parties making concessions 
should explain why they are making an offer, 
why they are choosing this particular one, 
and why the timing is signifi cant. 
As groups leverage a common understanding to 
strengthen political relationships, they face four 
critical issues: the problem of a shared future, 
the problem of trustworthiness, the problem of 
loss, and the problem of just entitlements. 
Building Trust
At the simplest level, each side’s arguments 
about the future are cries for recognition: 
Is there a place for me in this new future? 
If they are sustaining losses, parties must 
fi nd them bearable and believe that they will 
continue to have status and a role in the 
new order. 
Creating trust is critical to building a shared 
future. Parties must believe that their interests 
are now intertwined and will be promoted 
jointly. One way to build trust is to specify 
open and closed arguments: which issues will 
be left open, and which ones must be resolved 
now. Weaker parties will typically seek to 
leave issues open to create future leverage. 
Another strategy is to agree to cooperate, 
even though each side has different reasons 
for doing so. Groups might agree about the 
fi nal outcome, but disagree about the process, 
or vice versa, but use this commonality to 
move forward.
Validating Each Side’s Losses
Creating peace necessarily creates loss. One 
or more parties will give up gains and will 
typically perceive losses as greater than the 
other side’s. It’s a mistake to try and force 
parties to perceive their losses as equal; 
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There are four critical problems that have to be addressed 
to create meaningful reconciliation between warring parties:  
• The problem of a shared future   • The problem of trustworthiness
• The problem of loss   • The problem of just entitlements
— Negotiation Expert Reverend Byron Bland
the best approach is simply to get them to 
perceive the other side’s losses as authentic, 
said Bland. In Northern Ireland, mediators 
asked each side to speak about the other’s 
losses: When the Republicans articulated 
what the Unionists were giving up, the 
Unionists felt understood and validated. 
Because each side is typically losing 
something, both parties may feel that the 
new peace is unjust. Each side will differ in 
his opinion of what a just peace constitutes; 
hence, creating common ground is futile. 
Instead, parties should work to lessen the 
impact of injustice on each side. No one asks 
the question: “Is this a just peace?” Instead 
they ask themselves: “Is this peace worth 
enduring?” In South Africa, Nelson Mandela 
was able to win multiple concessions from 
President Frederik Willem de Klerk (equal 
voting rights and political power for the ANC 
among them) and end apartheid because he 
painted a picture of a shared future for both 
Africans and Afrikaners. 
During the question and answer period, 
a participant asked about the model’s 
applicability to non-Western cultures. 
Bland conceded that forgiveness was a Western 
construct, but said that all societies provide a 
means to repair broken relationships. Another 
asked how the model would apply to a group 
like the Taliban, which provides some services 
to the local population but has an unbearable 
ideology. Bland said that demonstrating 
trustworthiness was critical and drew 
parallels to the Israeli-Palestinian situation 
where each group’s posturing has hampered 
peace talks. 
“No one asks the question: ‘Is this a just peace?’ Instead they 
ask themselves: ‘Is this peace worth enduring?’” 
—  Reverend Byron Bland
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The event’s fi nal simulation offered a proving 
ground to practice new principles in the face of 
an escalating crisis. The setting: The fi ctional 
country of Meni, home to three different 
ethnic groups: the Lambilis, a Muslim group 
constituting 15% of the population; the Banas, 
Muslims representing 45% of the population; 
and the Owos, Christians comprising 40% 
of the population. The country has seen years 
of despotism and civil war, with fractured 
alliances between the different ethnic groups, 
as well as multiple coups. President Oboto, an 
Owo businessman, has escalated the crisis by 
selling state-owned farms, aiding new owners 
in evicting thousands of Bana farmers, and 
fi nancing a military offensive against a rebel 
Bana group, the National Salvation 
Front (NSF). With fi ghting between the 
government and rebels growing, hundreds 
of thousands of Bana and Lambili internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) have been forced to 
fl ee into the mountains between Meni and its 
neighbor Bakara. 
After growing international pressure, 
Meni’s leader, President Oboto, and the NSF 
leader Bashir agree to a ceasefi re, realizing 
it is in their best interests. President Oboto 
is afraid of overextending his forces, while 
Bashir wishes to protect the NSF’s most 
valuable asset, the Maru emerald mine. A  
UN peacekeeping force is sent to Meni to 
monitor the cease-fi re, establish disarmament 
centers, escort aid convoys, and create a 
secure environment for negotiating the 
peace settlement.
A Growing Humanitarian Crisis
Two NGOs have begun to work with the IDPs 
in this dangerous region: a global Christian 
NGO, Sanctuary International, and a local 
Muslim NGO, Zakat. However, the camps 
have quickly become a lightning rod: While 
80% of camp members are Bana and Lambili 
women and children, President Oboto has 
charged that many are soldiers and thus must 
disarm. Meanwhile, Bashir has defended the 
right of the IDPs to bear small arms. President 
Oboto’s capture of humanitarian convoys, 
led by Sanctuary International and their UN 
escorts, has just escalated the crisis. If the 
supplies, which include crucial vaccines, do 
not reach the camps within a week, a smallpox 
epidemic will surely erupt and claim the 
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For the event’s fi nal simulation, participants negotiated a crisis 
with no BATNA. Failure to mediate peace between two 
warring factions in the fi ctional country of Meni would mean 
thousands of internally displaced persons, who desperately needed 
vaccination, would perish in an impending smallpox epidemic. 
lives of tens of thousands. The UN’s Special 
Representative to the Secretary General 
must secure daunting commitments from the 
warring factions: the release of the convoys 
and personnel; and agreements to honor the 
ceasefi re, restart the disarmament process, 
and begin peace proceedings. 
Workshop facilitators created three 
subgroups and assigned participants roles 
as the president, rebel leader, multi-ethnic 
peace activists, UN Special Representative 
to the Secretary General, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
Representative, and two NGO leaders. 
Each group was to promote its own agenda, 
while the UN Special Representative sought 
to achieve consensus and the UN’s objectives. 
Workshop facilitators urged groups to 
assess the negotiation for key principles 
they had learned during the sessions – confl ict 
styles, positions and interests, BATNAs, 
third parties, and cultural differences – 
and implement new skills. Participants 
were encouraged to build trust with their 
counterparts and use creativity to 
fi nd solutions. 
Negotiating with Bullies
Groups were given three hours to complete 
the exercise. All of the participants playing 
the UN Special Representative chose to meet 
with some or all of the parties one-on-one to 
ascertain their interests and brainstorm 
a strategy. In the fi rst group, the UN Special 
Representative was able to form an alliance 
with the NGOs and local activists, agreeing 
to focus on short-term objectives like the 
hostage release, disarmament, and the 
ceasefi re. However, she ran into trouble 
when the president proved intractable and 
the UNHCR Representative antagonized 
others in the group, overstepping her mandate 
by offering solutions of her own and using 
infl ammatory language that divided the 
group further. 
In the second group, the president, who 
deliberately sat at the head of the table to 
establish his power, tied release of the convoy 
to disarmament. “I got everything I wanted,” 
he said, “because the group was so fi xated 
on the smallpox epidemic. I said that I 
would let the aid in if the NSF would disarm, 
and a minute later they were all beating on 
“I got everything I wanted,” said a workshop participant playing the 
role of President Oboto, “because the group was so ﬁ xated on the 
smallpox epidemic. I said that I would let the aid in if the NSF would 
disarm, and a minute later they were all beating on the NSF.” 
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the NSF.”  The third group created a series 
of milestones to accomplish their objectives: 
redeploying 10% of the UN Force to the 
camp to provide security, releasing the 
detainees, providing convoy security, and 
creating an established military perimeter. 
The smallpox crisis helped compel this 
group’s participants to agree on short-term 
objectives, and they decided to defer other 
issues until the next meeting. 
Small Things Count
Workshop facilitator Jonathan Morgenstein 
brought up some issues he had observed as he 
watched the different groups negotiate. In one 
group, Bashir and Oboto were seated 
side by side, which caused a problem when 
the rebel leader got up and walked away. 
Warring parties should never be seated 
next to each other. In another, the president 
proved a stickler for language, insisting that 
the convoy representatives be referred to as 
detainees, not hostages, since they were guests 
of the government. Language can often prove 
to be a lightning rod in negotiations, said 
Morgenstein, so it’s important to use terms 
that all members can agree to. In several 
groups, people tried to use the media 
to force others to make concessions; 
however, this ploy doesn’t work if the leaders 
you’re negotiating with don’t care about 
international censure. And fi nally, many 
groups had side negotiations, a common and 
useful practice, but one that can lead to leaks. 
As all of the groups witnessed, the mediator 
was ostensibly in charge, but could easily get 
sidelined by powerful personalities with 
competing demands. In addition, rogue 
operators were able to derail or delay even 
those agreements supported by most of the 
group’s players. Successful negotiators will 
keep the talks on course and use multiple 
tactics to achieve their objectives.
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Workshop participants 
network at the 
opening reception. 
 Conclusion
Working Effectively in Post-Confl ict and 
Humanitarian Situations: Tools for 
Communication, Collaboration, and 
Negotiation was designed to help relief actors 
refi ne negotiation skills and practice using 
them in scenarios that mimicked conditions 
they might experience in the fi eld. Participants 
learned about their personal confl ict styles and 
negotiation principles before executing a series 
of increasingly complex exercises that involved 
players with competing agendas, escalating 
crises, and third parties serving as mediators. 
To drive home learning objectives, participants 
assumed roles they would never play in the 
fi eld: A military commander became a rebel 
leader; a defense engineer, a despot; and 
an NGO representative, a US Army Civil 
Affairs liaison. This was uncomfortable for 
many participants, but forced them to think 
creatively to get their alter egos’ objectives 
accomplished. Ideally, this type of challenging 
role play would also improve participants’ 
ability to assess the positions and interests of 
their counterparts in the fi eld.  
During the multi-day event, participants 
used all fi ve negotiation styles – competing, 
avoiding, accommodating, compromising, 
and collaborating – to help groups with 
opposing objectives focus on higher-level 
purposes and create successful outcomes. 
In the Odin exercise, participants realized 
that articulating positions helped them 
fi nd common ground and create “win-win” 
agreements, while in the PRT exercise, 
they found that delineating cultural 
differences and information sharing 
objectives was instrumental in creating 
a model that would work for all 
participants. Finally, in the Meni 
simulation, participants used a wide array 
of strategies to execute a diffi cult scenario 
with no BATNA: holding preparatory 
meetings with a subset of participants, 
using short-term concessions to leverage 
longer-term agreements, tabling non-
urgent issues, and isolating troublesome 
participants. With the lives of so many 
on the line, participants had to execute 
a successful negotiation. One participant 
played the role of a third party, helping 
warring factions agree on terms that 
would address their interests, while 
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The workshop also helped participants build 
relationships and expand their understanding 
of the larger relief community. NGOs 
explained their organizations’ missions to the 
military personnel and described how grant 
cycles work. Meanwhile, military personnel 
clarifi ed common misperceptions about 
military authority. Although participants 
didn’t describe their organizations in detail 
until the fi nal day, all agreed that this was 
an incredibly useful process and should have 
happened on the fi rst day to set the stage for 
the learning exercises.
While divergent purposes and organizational 
cultures still separate NGOs, government 
civilian agencies, and the armed forces 
– hence one participant’s comment that 
“We’re not on the same team” – practitioners 
from all organizations increasingly see 
the value of working together in the fi eld. 
Whether they’re sharing information 
with other actors to improve security or 
operational effi ciency, teaming on strategies 
to help host governments avert or stabilize 
crises, or collaborating internally to improve 
effectiveness, practitioners can use negotiation 
techniques to ensure that they and their 
organizations are successful in the fi eld.  
Working Effectively helped practitioners 
develop a toolkit to use in a wide array of 
circumstances to create successful outcomes 
and build careers as the next generation of 
relief leaders. 
Global Majority Executive Director 
Lejla Mavris (left) and President William 
Monning (center) talk to Miranda Ibishi, 
a Program Coordinator with the 
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